We examine exchange-rate exposure in an international Bertrand model of differentiated goods using a "Rule of Three" (RoT) market structure that allows both within and between countries competition. We construct two versions of our model, a static and a dynamic one. In the latter, we explore how the intertemporal effects of exchange rates on the optimal prices of a firm's domestic and international rivals will affect a firm's long-run exposure in relation to its short-run exposure. We find that in the static version, the addition of a domestic competitor increases the firm's exposure, while the effect on its foreign competitor is ambiguous. In the dynamic case, we find that the gap in exposure between the RoT model and the international duopoly case is larger in the long run than in the short run for the company facing a domestic rival, while the exposure for that firm can be either smaller or larger in the long run relative to the short run. Finally, the firm that remains a monopolist in its domestic market has a smaller exposure in the long run as compared to the short run.
Introduction
Both the marketing and economics literature study markets where three competitors are present -a market structure known as a triopoly in economics and a "Rule of Three" (RoT) in marketing.
The marketing strand argues that the majority of manufacturing industries have a few large companies that lead the market followed by a fringe of firms (Axtell, 2001; Buzzell, 1981; Gans and Quiggin, 2003; Ijiri and Simon 1977; Quandt 1966) . Sheth and Sisodia (2002) argue that an industry structure consisting of three large generalists and numerous smaller specialists generates a competitive environment that is "optimal" for firm stability and profitability . Uslay et.al. (2010) show that industries with three firms financially outperform every other market structure, both in terms of operating returns to assets and in terms of annual cumulative abnormal returns. The RoT theory also appears in a variety of practitioner-oriented publications like Sheth and Sisodia (1998) , Gordon (2001) , Landry (2002) , Saffersfone (2002) and Henricks (2002) .
All these studies differ from our work in two main aspects. First, they study RoT market structures without dealing with the impact of exchange rates on profitability. They focus on the convergence to a RoT market structure, while we look at markets that already have converged to this market structure and study the impact of exchange rate on prices and profits (exposure) in an international Bertrand triopoly model.
The economics literature also looks at markets with three competitors (Shugan ,1989; Puu and Marin, 2006; Bouis et al., 2009; Ji, 2009; Elabbasy, et al., 2009; Elsadany et al., 2013; Matouk et. al., 2017; Shibata, 2016; Andaluz and Jarne, 2015; Andaluz, et. al. 2017) . All these studies differ from our work in two main aspects. First, they study a triopoly (or quadropoly) but in a closed economy, while we focus on an international triopoly modelling the competition between domestic and foreign firms, and the combined effects of the between and within competition. Second, the focus of our paper is not on stability, but on the impact of exchange rate on profits (exposure) in a price-setting model. This is important from a financial point of view, as it explains the implications on the performance on markets as they evolve into RoT ones. To the best of our knowledge, no other study examines the impact of exchange rates on prices (passthrough) and profits (exposure) on a RoT market structure. We study two versions of the RoT modela static and a dynamic oneto explore short-run and long-run exposure, which corresponds to consumable and durable goods respectively. For the latter model, we employ a switching cost model constructing a dynamic framework following the rich literature on switching costs with seminal articles, such as Beggs and Klemperer (1992) , Cabral and Villas-Boas (2005) and, more recently, Rhodes (2014) . We produce a theoretical framework that connects economics with strategic management, focusing on a price-setting model.
As mentioned above, our paper is connected to the exchange-rate exposure literature. Bodnar et al.,(2002) develop and estimate a model for eight Japanese export industries during 1986-1995. They examine if the relation between exchange-rate exposure and passthrough as derived in their model is consistent with actual market behavior. Flode´n et al. (2008) study how changes on the supply side across industries affects the relationship between passthrough and exposure. Since pricing affects profitability, they argue that nonlinearities in the cost function when studying the relationship between exchange-rate passthrough and exposure across industries are important. However, they study only the cases of monopolistic competition and a Bertrand and a Cournot duopoly, in which one of the two firms only operates in its domestic country and the other operates in both domestic and exports abroad, while we look at a RoT market structure. Bartram et al., (2008) Bodnar et al. do not study the impact of industry structure on exposure. Marston (2011) emphasizes the importance of the competitive structure of the industry in which a firm operates, on its economic exposure. However, he studies only the following cases: monopoly; a Cournot duopoly in which one of the two firms only operates in its domestic country and the other operates in both domestic and exports abroad; and the case of Stackelberg leadership by the exporting or the local firm. By contrast, we look at a RoT market structure.
The dynamic part of our RoT model also relates to the Froot and Klemperer (FK) (1989) and Gross and Schmitt (2000) (GS), (2000) switching cost models. FK are the first who construct an oligopoly model with dynamic demand-side effects by allowing the future demands of firms to depend on current market shares. Their model is a two-period dynamic game in which expected exchange rates affect the value of current market shares. However, their model only includes two producersone foreign, one domesticand the goods offered are homogenous.
GS use FK's switching cost model. They maximize the value of the firm, namely the present value of its profits, showing that an intertemporal link exists in pricing decisions in a durable goods two period model. The dynamic formulation allows the study of the exchange-rate passthrough both in the long run and in the short run; the result is that price interdependence matters and that exchange-rate fluctuations have significant feedback effects on prices, resulting in lowering passthrough in the long run rather than in the short run.
Both GS and Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2011) note that there is an intertemporal trade-off as far as switching costs are concerned. Both Rhodes and Cabral (2017) study how old customers lock into the products of a firm. Consequently, they are less sensitive to price changes by that firm and its competitors. On the other hand, new customers will be offered lower prices as a "firm's incentive to lock people in will outweigh the customer's incentive to avoid being locked in" (Rhodes, p. 172) . How the firm responds to an exchange-rate change will depend on how it values its future profits as measured by the size of the firm's discount factor.
We note that our analysis differs from the GS paper, as they study two foreign producers of a homogenous good serving a market with no home production under Bertrand competition, looking only at exchange-rate passthrough and not foreign exchange exposure. Our model looks at foreign exchange exposure in a RoT setting where there are two home firms and one foreign firm competing in a Bertrand differentiated goods framework. We study how the intertemporal effects of exchange rates on the optimal prices of a firm's domestic and international rivals will, in turn, change the magnitude of long-run as compared to short-run exposure.
General Framework
We start with a simple static model, as it is appropriate to study the impact of the exchange rate on consumable goods where the effect is a single-period one.
We study the impact of the exchange rate, S, on prices and profits in the Bertrand model in a setting of differentiated goods and linear demands. We first look at a simple model with one home, h, and one foreign firm, f, setting prices ℎ and respectively. The demand functions in the home and foreign markets are respectively ℎ ( ℎ , ; ) = + ℎ ℎ + and It is straightforward to show that an increase in S makes the h firm better (worse) off and the f firm worse (better) off if the equilibrium prices of their rivals are inelastic (elastic) in S. This is because
, where * , = * * <0, is the partial elasticity of the equilibrium foreign price wrt S and ℎ * =
is the equilibrium price-cost-margin of h. Hence, the sign of Π ℎ * depends on * , ; if the latter is elastic (inelastic) wrt S, the equilibrium profits of h decrease (increase) in S. Clearly, as S increases, unless f reduces its price so that it more than offsets the increase in S to restore its competitiveness, h will enjoy an increase in its optimal profits. The size of the change in the equilibrium profits of h depends on the cross-price substitution parameter, , the price sensitivity of its rival to S, and its own price-cost margin.
Similarly,
is the partial elasticity of the equilibrium home price wrt S and * = * − * is the equilibrium price-cost margin of f. Again, the sign of Π * depends on ℎ * , . If the equilibrium price of h is elastic (inelastic) wrt S, the profits of f increase (decrease) in S. Hence, the profits of f, whose currency appreciates, will decrease unless h more than counteracts its gain in competitiveness through a more than offsetting increase in its equilibrium price. So, the change in the equilibrium profits of f will depend on its price-cost margin and the degree of substitutability between the two goods, ℎ , ℎ * , , and will inversely depend on the square of S.
To conclude, in the 1x1 Bertrand model there is a link between the ability of each firm to pass on the exchange-rate change in the price it charges and the direction and degree of the impact on the profits of the other firm as a result of S.
The above results cover the cases where one of the two firms is a monopoly in its home market and competes in the foreign market with the domestic firm there. Interestingly, exchange-rate fluctuations do not affect just exporting firms, but even firms which focus on their home country (Marston; Aggarwal and Harper; .
A Rule of Three-Industry Structure
Now we study the impact of foreign exchange rates on profits and prices in a RoT market structure, with differentiated products and linear demands, when firms compete in prices.
Consumable Goods

Between-and Within-home Countries Bertrand Competition
There are three firmswe assume two home firms and one foreign. (1)
The direct terms parameters are all negative, i.e. 11,ℎ , 22,ℎ , < 0 . The parameters pair, 12,ℎ , 21,ℎ are the within countries cross-price effects, while the pairs 1, , 2, and 1,ℎ , 2,ℎ are the between countries cross-price effects involving the two h firms and the f firm.
The firms produce substitutes, so all the cross-price effects are positive. We assume that each firm's own price has a greater absolute effect on its demand than that of the prices of the firms it competes with, both domestically and abroad. Hence, | 11,ℎ | > 12,ℎ , 1, , | 22,ℎ | > 21,ℎ , 2,f , | | > 1,ℎ , 2,ℎ .There are no fixed production costs, and marginal costs are constant, while 1ℎ < 1, , 2ℎ < 2, , < . The optimization problems for the two h firms and the f firm are as follows: gives the impact of a change in S on the prices of h and f firms. In the 1x1 Bertrand model, an increase in S decreases (increases) the price of the firm in the appreciating (depreciating) country.
Proposition 1
An increase in S has a positive impact on the optimal prices of the home goods and a negative impact on the optimal price of the foreign goods.
Proof
Please refer to the MA.
In the 1x1 case, the existence of between competition only results in a positive (negative) derivative of the equilibrium price of the h (f) firm wrt S. The addition of a second home firm, which introduces within competition in the home market alone, does not affect the sign of the results. We next study Hence, the impact of S on the profits of this firm depends on the firm's own price elasticity of demand (as reflected through its inverse relation to the price-cost margin, ,ℎ * ) and on both of its two rivals' (home and foreign) price sensitivity to the exchange rate (i.e. passthrough). The addition of a home competitor increases the firm's exchange-rate exposure relative to the international duopoly (1x1) case. In the case of an increase in S, it will affect the profits positively because of the home currency's depreciation. We note that if * , is in absolute value sufficiently larger than one, then the profits of the i h firm may decrease rather than increase because of an increase in S.
The impact of S on the profit of the f firm depends on the elasticities of the two h firms: Consequently, as in the 1x1 case, the impact of S on the profits of the f firm may end up being either positive or negative depending on the size of the two h firms price elasticities wrt S. Given the ambiguity in the signs, it is impossible to determine whether the addition of a domestic competitor in one country increases or decreases exposure for the firm in the other country relative to the international duopoly case.
Durable Goods
Between-and Within-home Countries Bertrand Competition
In this section, we set a dynamic model that describes the behavior of the three firms in a durable goods context. The firms choose prices ,1,ℎ , ,2,ℎ and P , in periods = 1,2 respectively. We look for a subgame perfect equilibrium using backward induction. The value of each firm at time t is the present value of its future profits Π + at the one-period discount factor 1,ℎ , 2,ℎ , for each of the three firms respectively. The value functions for the h and f firms are the present values of their profits and their optimization problems in a simple twoperiod game are as follows: where 1,1,ℎ , 1,2,ℎ and 1, are the outputs of the two h firms and the f firm respectively in the first period, and 1 and 2 the corresponding exchange rates in the first and second periods respectively.
We use backward induction starting from period = 2. As there are switching costs, a higher consumer base in the first period would imply that consumers will be "locked-in" and buy from the same firm in the second period. Hence, we first maximize the profits of each firm in the second period, bearing in mind that the prices set in the first period determine the position of the demand in the second period. This means that all the second-period demand intercepts 2,1, , 2,2, and 2, are no longer exogenously determined and fixed, but are instead a function of the prices as set by the firms in the first period, i.e. for firm 1, 2,1, ( 1,1,ℎ , 1,2,ℎ , 1, ; 1 ), where 2,1, 1,1,ℎ < 0, 2,1, 1,2,ℎ > 0, 2,1, 1, > 0. Similar results hold for the other two intercepts with a negative own-price impact and positive cross-price impact. This follows the approach of GS, where "prices set in the first period determine the position of the demand in the second period" (p.92).
We argue that this shift will only affect the intercept terms. This is a realistic assumption, as unless the relative prices of the goods change substantially between the two subsequent periods, we do not expect that the own-and cross-price effects parameters will change. The consumers will alter the degree that they substitute among different goods only when relative prices change substantially. 1 Hence, without loss of generality, and in order to retain tractability in our results, we assume that the own-and cross-substitution parameters are fixed during these two periods. We first focus on period = 2, where each firm needs to find the prices in the second period that maximize the expression below:
Home Country:
Firm 1 1 An episode of deep price cuts by The Times in 1993 (from 45p to 30p), severely affected the market share of Daily Express ( typically classified as belonging in the mid-market range) rather than the upper range "quality" newspapers (The Times, Guardian, Telegraph and the Independent), thus altering the definition of the market (Behringer and Filistrucchi 2015) . ,] ′ = [0, 0, 0] ′ , to obtain the optimal prices that satisfy the F.O.Cs for the second period. We derive prices 21,ℎ , 22,ℎ , 2, , i.e. "intermediate" optimal
prices of the second period that are functions of prices in the first period.
Hence, the optimal prices M in the second period are functions of the prices and exchange rates in the first period through the impact of the latter on the second-period demand intercept parameters. We correspondingly define: π 2,1,ℎ ( 1,1,ℎ , 1,2,ℎ , 1, ; 2 ), π 2,2,ℎ ( 1,1,ℎ , 1,2,ℎ , 1, ; 2 ), π 2, ( 1,1,ℎ , 1,2,ℎ , 1, ; 2 )
as the intermediate profits for the second period, once the intermediate optimal prices for the second period have been inserted, thus making these profits only functions of the prices in the first period.
Consequently, to find the equilibrium prices in the first period we now feed the above relations into the value functions and write them as functions of the prices and exchange rates in period 1. The F.O.Cs for the two home and the foreign firm are: (4)
The dynamic optimal prices for the three firms, 1,1,ℎ * , 1,2,ℎ * , 1, * , are derived from solving the above equations. They will only depend on the exogenous variables of the model, i.e. the exchange rate as well as the cost of each firm.
In the case of durable goods, the specification retains the features that we encounter in the GS model. All other things being equal, a higher output today resulting from a lower price charged for the good translates to a higher demand for the same good tomorrow and thus a higher profit. In other words, the presence of a dynamic effect implies that pricing decisions today will have an impact on prices (and consequently profits) tomorrow by securing a larger customer base in subsequent periods.
Similarly, an increase in the price of a good in period 1 will decrease the demand for that same good, not only in the first period, but also in the second period. In other words, a) The first-period profit exposure: c) The negative impact on the second-period profit function of firm i via the intertemporal effect of 1 on the first-period price of the firm from the currency appreciating country:
As the impact of an increase in 1 on the optimal price chosen by f is negative, its optimal price in the first period decreases. This leads to a negative impact on the profits of the h firm, thus offsetting the gains from the depreciation in the home currency for firm i.
We draw two conclusions from the above result. First, we note that in the international duopoly (1x1) case the intertemporal effect of term (b) would not exist. This means that the difference in the exposure between the RoT model and the (1x1) model is larger in the long run than in the short run. Second, in the RoT case, the existence of two intertemporal effects with opposing signs means that we do not know whether the firm's long-run exposure is larger or smaller relative to its short-run exposure. This contrasts with the 1x1 case exposure, where the long-run exposure is unambiguously smaller than the short-run given the absence of an intertemporal effect from a domestic competitor. a) The first-period profit exposure: The above result implies that the exchange-rate exposure for the f firm in the long run will be smaller than in the short run. In other words, the stock price for the firm is less sensitive to exchange rates than the profits.
Proof
We note that the first term in the equation for each h firm includes the two terms found in the static relation in Proposition 2. The new terms in the second bracket are the positive (and correspondingly negative) impact on the value function of firm 1 via the intertemporal effect of rival firm. Similarly for h firm 2. The equation for the f firm reads analogously as long-run exposure = short-run exposure + sum of intertemporal effects of 1 on the optimal first-period price of f firm's two overseas rivals.
We note that in the case of an international duopoly, which we have studied above, there is only a between dynamic interaction effect, which is negative, and the long-run exposure is lower than the short-run. In other words, the stock price is less sensitive than the profits to changes in 1 .
Conclusions
This paper constructs a mathematical model of exchange-rate exposure of firms competing in an international RoT market structure. This framework extends previous approaches by allowing within and between countries competition. It constructs two versions of the RoT model, a static and a dynamic one, to explore consumable and durable goods producing firms respectively. The coexistence of between and within competition enhances our knowledge of competition interactions among firms in an international oligopoly. We establish a link between the ability of each firm to pass on the exchange-rate change in the price it charges its customers and the direction and degree of the impact on the profits of the other firms.
In particular, we find that in the static case the addition of a domestic competitor in one of the countries increases the firm's exposure in that country, while the effect on its foreign competitor is ambiguous as it depends on the sizes of the exchange-rate elasticities of its two overseas competitors. In the dynamic case, we find that the gap in exposure between the RoT model and the (1x1) case is larger in the long run than in the short run for the company that now faces a domestic rival. On the other hand, the two intertemporal effects (domestic and foreign) have opposing signs. This means that the foreign-exchange exposure can be either smaller or larger in the long run relative to the short run. Finally, the firm that remains a monopolist in its domestic market finds that its exposure in the long run is smaller than in the short run.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
We differentiate the optimal prices wrt S: Hence, the optimal price for two home firms increases in S. Therefore, the optimal price for the foreign firm decreases in S.
Q.E.D. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3 By solving Eqs. (2), (3), and (4), we deduce the optimal dynamic prices in the first period, i.e. 11,ℎ * , 12,ℎ * , and 1, * . Replacing them into the V (value) functions of each company, we examine the impact of exchange rates in period 1 on the value functions:
For firm 1: 
